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Navigating the shoals of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos . . . has proven to be tricky business.1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos2 significantly 
impacted the landscape of public workplace free speech jurisprudence.3 This is 
particularly true for the nation’s millions of unionized public sector workers, such as 
its public school teachers, who have collectively bargained to have grievance 
procedures available to them for lodging complaints with their employers.4 In 1987, 
the Court had announced,
It is well settled that public school teachers . . . do not check their First 
Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door when they enter public 
employment. Nonetheless, it is also true that a public employer has a distinct 
interest in regulating the speech of its employees in order to ensure and 
promote the “efficiency of the public services it performs.”5
 For more than forty years—from Pickering v. Board of Education6 until Garcetti— 
courts balanced these competing interests by analyzing whether the subject matter of 
the speech addressed a “matter of public concern.” While the Court in Pickering made 
reference to the public employee/private citizen distinction, it was not a dispositive 
focus of that holding or of the cases that followed.7 By contrast, the phrase “matter of 
public concern” appears in each of the three substantive sections, Parts II through IV, 
of the Pickering decision. Thus the focus of the decision was on the public interest 
1. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2011).
2. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). As discussed below, the Supreme Court in Garcetti ruled that public employees do 
not enjoy First Amendment free speech protection when speaking pursuant to their official duties and 
not as citizens. Id. at 421.
3. According to WestLaw, as of January 25, 2013, Garcetti had been cited by courts 1875 times in cases 
around the country. Of those, it was cited positively in 1773, or 94.5% of the cases; courts declined to 
extend it in twelve cases, or 0.6% of the cases. In May 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Schumann v. Dianon Systems, 43 A.3d 111 (Conn. 2012), which extended Garcetti into the 
private sector as well.
4. See Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reporting a total of 7.6 million public sector union members in the United States in 2010).
5. Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Rankin 
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
6. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
7. Id. at 568 (“To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that teachers 
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as 
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools 
in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior 
decisions of this Court.”). In fact, the term “citizen” appears in the Pickering decision only twice, both 
times attached to the phrase “commenting upon matters of public concern,” and both in the initial 
substantive section (Part II) of the decision. See also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011).
907
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
aspect of the statement, as the Court—in what has come to be called the “Pickering 
Test”—balanced “the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting on matters 
of public concern” against “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”8 As the Second 
Circuit noted in Jackler v. Byrne, however, the Supreme Court in Garcetti “parsed” the 
analysis “into separate questions as to (1) whether the subject of the employee’s speech 
was a matter of public concern and (2) whether the employee spoke ‘as a citizen’ rather 
than solely as an employee.”9
 This note explains that in Garcetti, by giving determinative effect to the “as a 
citizen” element, the Court introduced a threshold step in the analysis of workplace 
speech. Now, before courts may engage in a Pickering analysis10 (i.e., determining 
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern and then 
balancing the relevant competing interests)11 courts must first determine whether the 
plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen or as a public employee.12 If the court finds 
that the employee was speaking as a citizen, it proceeds to examine whether the speech 
was on a matter of public concern.13 However, if the court finds that the employee was 
speaking as a public employee, the analysis ends and the plaintiff loses summarily.14
8. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
9. 658 F.3d at 235. While the Court in Garcetti did not directly specify why it found it necessary to focus on 
the “citizen” element, it did suggest a rationale when it instructed that “[r]estricting speech that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what that 
employer itself has commissioned or created.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006).
10. Following Pickering, courts considered: (1) whether the employee was speaking on a matter of public 
concern; (2) whether the employee’s speech was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment 
action; and (3) how to balance the competing interests of the employee’s right to speak on matters of 
public interest and concern with the employer’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public service 
it performs through its employees.” This test is commonly referred to as the Pickering Balancing Test. 
Public Employment Law Press, Essentials of the “Pickering Balancing Test,” N.Y. Pub. Pers. Law (Jan 4. 
2010), http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/01/essentials-of-pickering-balancing-test.html 
(quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
11. “To constitute speech on a matter of public concern, an employee’s expression must ‘be fairly considered 
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236 
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
12. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. In introducing this “status” consideration, the Court in Garcetti, however, 
mischaracterizes the initial Pickering inquiry as concerning the status of the speaker when the speech in 
question was made. (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide 
interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech. The first requires 
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Id.). In fact, there 
is no mention in Pickering of such a dispositive consideration of status. Indeed, Pickering was not so 
construed until Garcetti. Additionally, courts are divided as to whether this is a question of fact or of 
law. Compare Jackler, 658 F.3d at 237 (holding that the determination of “whether the employee spoke 
solely as an employee and not as a citizen is also largely a question of law for the court”) with Jackson v. 
Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the determination of whether a 
plaintiff was speaking pursuant to official duties is a question of fact).
13. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
14. Id.
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 Courts, including the Second Circuit in Weintraub v. Board of Education, have 
answered the first question by determining whether the employee’s speech has a 
“relevant analogue to citizen speech.”15 In a case of first impression, the Second 
Circuit in Weintraub determined that the filing of a workplace grievance in accordance 
with the employee’s union contract had no citizen analogue and therefore was an 
“official duty” of a New York City public school teacher and not protected by the 
First Amendment under Garcetti.16 In Weintraub III, the Second Circuit, expressly 
following Garcetti ’s analytical bifurcation, asserted that, if it found that Weintraub 
either did not speak as a citizen or did not speak on a matter of public concern, 
Weintraub would have no First Amendment protection against employer retaliation.17 
The court therefore held that “Weintraub, by filing a grievance with his union to 
complain about his supervisor’s failure to discipline a child in his classroom, was 
speaking pursuant to his official duties and thus not as a citizen.”18
 This holding presents a new legal problem: union grievances filed by public 
employees are now categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. And 
one result of Weintraub III, as Judge Calabresi observed in dissent, is that public 
employees now have the incentive to take workplace concerns directly to the public 
rather than raising them internally with their employer to avoid generating unnecessary 
public alarm.19
15. See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241; Spencer v. City 
of New York, No. 06 CV 2852(KMW), 2012 WL 2866263 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012); Whitehead v. 
City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 0951(ILG)(VVP), 2012 WL 4858989 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012); Fahs 
Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Gray, No. 3:10–cv–0129 (GTS/DEP), 2012 WL 6097293 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 
2012); Matthews v. Lynch, No. 3:07–cv–739 (WWE), 2011 WL 1363783 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2011).
16. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Weintraub III]. Throughout 
this note the following additional abbreviations are used: Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 2d 38 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Weintraub I); Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F. Supp. 2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(Weintraub II). When referring to the whole group of these cases the generic abbreviation Weintraub is 
used.
17. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 207 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Notably, Justice Stevens makes essentially the same point in his 
dissent in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006). For a more in-depth discussion of the public 
policy implications of the line of post-Garcetti cases, see Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court 
on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/
Citizen Speech Partition, 8 J.L. Soc’y 45, 81 (2007) (arguing that if employees “speak only publicly, they 
essentially forfeit their ability to stay in their jobs, first because they become pariahs, and second, 
because they have refused to use the employer’s internal mechanisms for complaint (mechanisms which, 
if used, would eliminate their First Amendment rights)); Raj Chohan, Tenth Circuit Interpretations of 
Garcetti: Limits on First Amendment Protections for Whistle-Blowers, 85 Denv. L. Rev. 573, 594 (2008) 
(arguing that Garcetti “appears to have created a perverse incentive that encourages government 
employees to take their problems first to the media, or any authority outside of the employee’s immediate 
chain of command”); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: the Impact of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 209, 227 (2008) (“As post-Garcetti 
cases demonstrate, the Garcetti decision has significant implications for school employees, especially in 
the limits it places on reporting troublesome practices in school systems.”); Christine Elzer, Note, The 
“Official Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After 
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 This note argues that Garcetti is inapposite in cases concerning otherwise 
protected activity because the public employee/private citizen status distinction 
should be irrelevant in instances where: (a) Garcetti would protect the private citizen; 
(b) various federal, state and local laws protect the public employee; and (c) the 
speech in question addressed a matter of public concern. Specifically, this note posits 
that the filing of a union grievance—an otherwise legally protected activity20—
should not constitute a public employee’s “official duty” for purposes of a First 
Amendment analysis of public workplace speech. In so doing, this note endeavors to 
rescue the union grievance, a category of speech in which thousands of public 
employees engage every year, from the over-broad reach of Garcetti.
 Part II of this note brief ly explains the purpose and importance of union 
grievances. Part III presents the legal evolution of public workplace speech 
jurisprudence under the First Amendment, beginning in 1968 with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pickering and concluding in 2010 with the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Weintraub III. Part IV examines the application of Garcetti in the years 
since its issuance in 2006, focusing specifically on two discrete, though interconnected, 
doctrinal elements: Part IV.A argues that Garcetti ’s “citizen analogue” requirement 
should be inapplicable in a workplace speech analysis involving union grievance 
cases. Part IV.B focuses on the “official duties” analysis employed by the Garcetti 
Court and connects that analysis to Weintraub, arguing that the filing of a union 
grievance should not constitute an employee’s “official duty” because such conduct is: 
(1) a right held by the employee, to be exercised, or not, at that employee’s discretion 
and (2) a legally protected activity under federal, state, and local law. Part V briefly 
concludes by proposing a new workplace speech test that both incorporates the 
relevant considerations of Pickering, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garcetti, and a 
district court case from Michigan, Montle v. Westwood Heights School District,21 and 
that excludes Garcetti’s “public citizen” threshold criterion from consideration.
ii. thE pUrpOsE and iMpOrtanCE Of UniOn griEVanCEs
 A. Union Grievances and Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
 The union grievance is, and has long been, an integral part of the labor-
management relationship in the unionized workplace, and a fundamental component 
of collective bargaining—and collective bargaining agreements—because it affords 
the employee the opportunity to complain, formally to her employer, about her 
workplace conditions through a channel not under the employer’s control. Moreover, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 367 (2007) (arguing that “public employees are better off 
ignoring internal grievance procedures and running straight to high government officials or the media 
with any complaints they might have”).
20. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
21. 437 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (introducing into the workplace speech analysis a practical 
consideration of whether the speech in question actually caused disruption); id. at 656. The Supreme 
Court in Garcetti had alluded to this consideration without specifically identifying it. See Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 422–23.
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it allows her to do so free of employer retaliation. The vast majority of union contracts 
contain mechanisms, agreed upon by the employer and the union during the 
collective bargaining process, for the resolution of employee grievances concerning 
the terms and conditions of their work and workplace.22
 “Collective bargaining is not confined to the periodic negotiations that lead to a 
written contract, but is a day-to-day process in which the grievance procedure plays 
a very important role. ‘The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the 
continuous collective bargaining process.’”23 It is the product of negotiations between 
the employer and the employee’s authorized labor union and is codified in the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement.
 The most common union contract grievance procedures define a “grievance” as 
any claim of violation, misapplication or misinterpretation of the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement and lay out a multi-stage procedure for its resolution.24 
Typically, this procedure ends with the parties submitting their dispute to binding 
arbitration by a neutral third-party arbitrator whose authority is limited to the 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement consistent with the generally 
accepted canons of contract interpretation.25 In other words, the employer does not 
finally determine whether its own conduct—or that of an employee—violated the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This method of workplace dispute 
resolution has been the part of our national labor relations policy for decades.
 A decade after passage of the National Labor Relations Act,26 the President’s 
National Labor-Management Conference of 1945 issued a report to the President 
which asserted:
22. See Elkouri & Elkouri: How Arbitration Works 10 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) (citing 
a study by the Bureau of National Affairs, published in 1995, which surveyed 400 contracts and reported 
that eighty percent contained provisions for the arbitration of disputes involving interpretation or 
application of the contract). One provision reported in the 1995 study is the “Safety & Health” article in 
the New York City teachers’ contract at the center of Weintraub, available at http://www.uft.org/files/
contract_pdfs/teachers-contract-2007-2009.pdf.
23. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22, at 198 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574 (1960), one of the cases from the Steelworkers Trilogy in which the Supreme Court 
articulated a preference for arbitration over litigation in resolving workplace disputes).
24. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that public employees are 
minimally entitled to “oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s 
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story”).
25. See generally Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22; Labor Arbitration: A Practical Guide for 
Advocates (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990); Robert V. Massey, History of Arbitration and 
Grievance Arbitration in the United States, available at http://www.laborstudiesandresearch.
ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013); Mark M. Grossman, The Question of 
Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction and Authority (1984). The 
scope of an arbitrator’s authority in adjudicating labor disputes arising from collective bargaining 
agreements “is confined to interpretation and application” of those agreements, and while the arbitrator 
may “look for guidance from many sources,” the award must “draw[] its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement.” Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
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Collective bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions is required by 
law. It is approved by the public. It is and must be accepted by employers, 
employees, and their representatives in every instance where workers choose 
to organize to bargain collectively on questions of wages, hours, and working 
conditions.27
The Conference further recommended:
Collective bargaining agreements should contain provisions that grievances 
and disputes involving the interpretation or application of the terms of the 
agreement are to be settled without resort to strikes, lock-outs, or other 
interruptions to normal operations by an effective grievance procedure with 
arbitration as its final step.28
 B. Legal Protections Afforded to the Filing of Union Grievances
 An employee’s right to file a contract grievance is protected by both state and 
federal labor laws. Formalized grievance procedures adopted by employers are 
supposed to be more efficient, less expensive, and more amicable than traditional 
litigation in judicial forums; they discourage self-help and minimize disruption to 
the business operation.29
 In the private sector, section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act 
provides that “[f]inal adjustment [of employee grievances] by a method agreed upon 
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance 
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement.” Section 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice—i.e., a 
violation of the Act—for an employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce” employees 
exercising their rights under the Act.30 In addition, section 158(a)(4) makes it an 
unfair labor practice for an employer to “discharge or otherwise discriminate” against 
an employer for filing charges under the Act.31
 In New York, public employees are guaranteed the right to file grievances in the 
Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, commonly referred to as the Taylor Law.32 
27. See Walter Park Stacy, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The President’s National Labor-Management 
Conference: Summary and Committee Reports 52 (1946), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
uiug.30112018113362 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
28. Id. at 45–46. The Conference went on to recommend specific standards for an effective grievance 
procedure. These include: clear statement of the successive steps and methods of presentation and 
appeal, design to facilitate expeditious settlement, adequate stated time limits for both presentation of 
grievances and rendering of decisions, final appeal heard by impartial arbitrator who would issue 
binding decision. Id.
29. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22, at 11.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
31. Id.
32. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. §§ 203, 204, 208, 209-a. In addition, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-312(d) makes 
waiver of alternative tribunals, administrative or judicial, a condition precedent for the invocation of 
grievance arbitration. Jerome Lefkowitz, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Public Sector, in 
Labor Arbitration, supra note 25. 
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In addition, New York Labor Law expressly prohibits retaliatory action by employers 
against employees who complain about workplace conditions or employer practices.33
iii. first aMEndMEnt prOtECtiOn fOr pUbLiC EMpLOYEE spEECh
 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” and the Supreme 
Court has held that “[n]either the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that 
this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately 
with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”34 Since 1968, 
First Amendment workplace free speech jurisprudence has been anchored by 
Pickering v. Board of Education.
 A. Pickering Establishes the Two-Part Inquiry for Public Employee Speech
 In Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher wrote a letter to the editor of a local 
newspaper criticizing the way in which the school district’s board of education and 
superintendent handled proposals to raise revenue for the school.35 As a consequence 
of the letter, the school district terminated Pickering’s employment.36 Pickering 
challenged the termination in state court claiming a violation of the First 
Amendment.37 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “absent proof of false 
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to 
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from 
public employment.”38
 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court employed a two-step inquiry to 
determine whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected: the first 
step asks whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern.39 As noted above, however, the Court focused its first-step analysis on the 
33. N.Y. Lab. § 740 et seq. (McKinney 2011). Specifically, § 740(2) provides, in pertinent part:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because 
such employee does any of the following: (a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a 
supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in 
violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial 
and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care 
fraud; (b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an 
investigation, hearing or inquiry into any such violation of a law, rule or regulation by 
such employer; or (c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, policy or 
practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation.
34. Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
35. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 566–68.
38. Id. at 574.
39. Id. at 569–72. In dicta, the Court made passing reference to the status of the employee, whether as a 
private citizen or public employee, at the time the speech was made. This consideration was not dispositive 
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“matter of public concern” element and not on the “citizen” element. If it is determined 
that the employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the second 
step examines whether the government employer had adequate justification for 
treating the employee differently from other private citizens.40 In other words, the 
second step of the Pickering Test balances the interests of the employee in speaking 
out on a public issue against the employer’s interests in the efficient operation of its 
public service.41
 In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, the Supreme Court 
clarified the reach of Pickering, holding that First Amendment protection extends to 
private conversations between employees and their employers.42 The Court rejected 
the Fifth Circuit’s reading that Pickering stood for the proposition that “private 
expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected”43 and held that it 
was “unable to agree that private expression of one’s views is beyond constitutional 
protection.”44
in this case, however, and the Court did not say how analysis of that status is to be conducted, or what 
factors are to be considered, although it did provide some guidance. Specifically, the Court held that
[Pickering’s] statements are in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant 
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher. Thus no 
question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among 
coworkers is presented here. Appellant’s employment relationships with the Board and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of close working 
relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and 
confidence are necessary to their proper functioning. Accordingly, to the extent that the 
Board’s position here can be taken to suggest that even comments on matters of public 
concern that are substantially correct . . . may furnish grounds for dismissal if they are 
sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject it.
 Id. at 569–70.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 568; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
42. Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979).
43. Id.
44. Id. In a germane footnote, the Court observed that,
[a]lthough the First Amendment’s protection of government employees extends to private 
as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each context may involve 
different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his 
statements that must be assessed to determine whether they “in any way either impeded 
the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with 
the regular operation of the schools generally.”
 Id. at 415 n.4 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73). The Court further asserted that 
[p]rivate expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to the 
Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate 
superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by 
the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and place in which 
it is delivered.
 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court further developed this post-Pickering analysis in Connick v. 
Myers, where the Court considered whether a questionnaire about employee 
confidence in particular superiors addressed a matter of public or private concern.45 
The Court, asserting that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of 
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record,” found the question addressed only private 
concerns, and held that private concerns are unprotected.46
 From Pickering until Garcetti, the First Amendment analysis of workplace speech 
analysis began with a consideration of the subject matter of the speech by asking 
specifically whether it addressed a matter of public concern.47 If it did, the courts 
balanced the government’s interest in the smooth, efficient operation of its public 
service against the employee’s interest in speaking freely on a public issue. Garcetti 
changed all that with its imposition of threshold criterion for protection.
 B. Garcetti Introduces Standard for Determining Status of Speaker
 Little changed in workplace speech jurisprudence over the two decades after 
Connick. Then in 2006, the Supreme Court substantively altered the workplace 
speech analysis in Garcetti v. Ceballos. For the first time, the Court focused on the 
“citizen” element of Pickering’s “as a citizen on a matter of public concern” analysis, 
establishing a dispositive threshold inquiry. In this case, the Court introduced a test 
for determining whether the speech was on a matter of public concern that required 
inquiry into the status of the speaker at the time the speech was made: whether the 
speech was made “pursuant to” the employee’s “official duties.”
 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, an experienced deputy district attorney in the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, was informed by a defense attorney that 
an affidavit used by law enforcement to obtain a search warrant and arrest the 
attorney’s client contained inaccuracies, and asked to review the case.48 Ceballos 
determined that the affidavit did contain “serious misrepresentations”49 and 
communicated these findings to his supervisors. He followed that discussion with a 
disposition memorandum, explaining his concerns and recommending dismissal of 
the case.50 However, despite Ceballos’s concerns, his supervisors opted to proceed 
45. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
46. Id. at 147–48.
47. The Court in Pickering referred to “[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters 
of public importance” as “the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 573. Similarly, Justice Souter in his dissent in Garcetti described the “First Amendment 
safeguard” as resting on “the value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a public 
employee may disclose” because they “‘are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for 
which they work.’” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 429 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 
(1994)).
48. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410, 413–14 (2006).
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 414.
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with the case. Ceballos was then called as a witness for the defense.51 Following his 
testimony, Ceballos claimed that “he was subjected to a series of retaliatory 
employment actions.”52 Ceballos brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California alleging that the district attorney, Gil Garcetti, and 
two of Ceballos’s supervisors violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 
retaliating against him for writing his memo.53
 The district court found that because Ceballos wrote the memo “pursuant to his 
employment duties . . . he was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the 
memo’s contents.”54 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that “‘Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected 
speech under the First Amendment.’”55 The court of appeals based this conclusion 
on an analysis of Pickering and its progeny, as well as its finding that Ceballos’s 
memo, “which recited what he thought to be governmental misconduct, was 
‘inherently a matter of public concern.’”56 The court of appeals “concluded that 
Ceballos’ memo satisfied the public-concern requirement,” and “proceeded to balance 
Ceballos’ interest in his speech against his supervisors’ interest in responding to it,” 
finding in Ceballos’s favor.57
 The Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four decision, holding that “when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”58 The Court found 
that Ceballos had not spoken as a citizen when he wrote his memo. Instead, “[w]hen 
he . . . performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government 
employee.”59 The Court concluded that the court of appeals failed to consider 
whether Ceballos’s speech was made in his capacity as a private citizen.60 In so doing, 
the Court introduced a new threshold inquiry into public workplace speech analyses: 
whether the plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen at the time the speech in 
question was made.61
51. Id.
52. Id. at 415.
53. Id. 
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004)).
56. Id. at 416; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to 
conclude that if [the speech in question] cannot fairly be characterized as constituting speech on a matter 
of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [the employee’s] discharge.”). 
57. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.
58. Id. at 421.
59. Id. at 422.
60. Id. at 416.
61. Id.
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 The decision produced three separate dissents. For Justice Stevens, “[t]he notion 
that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in 
the course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”62 He further noted that in Givhan, 
the Court was silent on the question of whether Givhan’s speech was made pursuant 
to her job duties, demonstrating, for Justice Stevens, “that the point was immaterial.”63
 Justice Souter, who was joined in his dissent by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
stated:
[P]rivate and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to 
health and safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on 
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible to claim First 
Amendment protection.64
Justice Souter’s analysis emphasizes the balancing of interests between public 
employee and government employer, protecting the workplace speech “on a significant 
public issue” unless that speech is “too damaging to the government’s capacity to 
conduct public business to be justified by any individual or public benefit.”65 Like 
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter rejected the status assessment as a dispositive inquiry: 
“there is no good reason for categorically discounting a speaker’s interest in 
commenting on a matter of public concern just because the government employs 
him.”66 Furthermore, Justice Stevens rejected the “official duties” test as unjustified, 
noting that “[t]here is no adequate justification for the majority’s line categorically 
denying Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”67 
Justice Souter also asserted that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately 
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can 
weigh out in an employee’s favor.”68
 Justice Breyer found this list too limiting. He recognized the need to afford 
government employers “sufficient discretion to manage their operations,” but found 
the majority’s categorical denial of protection to any speech uttered pursuant to the 
speaker’s official duties to be “too absolute.”69 Instead, Justice Breyer would return to 
the Pickering standard70 and concluded, “[T]he First Amendment sometimes does 
authorize judicial actions based upon a government employee’s speech that both (1) 
62. Id. at 427.
63. Id. Justice Stevens also points out the perversity of “fashion[ing] a new rule that provides employees 
with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors.” Id.
64. Id. at 428.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 428–29.
67. Id. at 429.
68. Id. at 435.
69. Id. at 446.
70. Id. 
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involves a matter of public concern and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary 
job-related duties.”71
 C. Weintraub III Expressly Implicates the Union Grievance
 The impact of Garcetti, particularly in its prescription of a new threshold inquiry, 
was seen almost immediately in the context of the union grievance. While Garcetti had 
arguably provided the theoretical underpinning linking the union grievance to “official 
duties,” it was not until Weintraub v. Board of Education that this link was expressly 
articulated. Weintraub was a case of first impression regarding whether the filing of a 
union contract grievance constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment, and is 
thus an important case in the evolving jurisprudence of workplace speech.72
 In Weintraub III, the Second Circuit held that a public school teacher’s filing of a 
grievance—in accordance with his collective bargaining agreement—regarding the 
school administration’s lack of response to a school safety issue that arose in his 
classroom did not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.73 In so 
holding, the court determined that David Weintraub was acting as a public employee 
performing his “official duties” rather than as a private citizen when he filed his 
grievance.74 The court justified this conclusion by noting that “Weintraub’s grievance 
was ‘pursuant to’ his official duties because it was ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ 
about his ability to ‘properly execute his duties’ as a public school teacher—namely, to 
maintain classroom discipline, which is an indispensible prerequisite to effective 
teaching and classroom learning.”75
 But, as discussed in Part IV below, that explains only why the subject of 
Weintraub’s grievance touched upon his official duties. It does not elucidate why the 
filing of a grievance is itself an official duty of a teacher. Likewise, the court’s 
conclusion that “Weintraub spoke pursuant to his job duties . . . [because] the speech 
took the form of an employee grievance, for which there is no relevant citizen 
analogue” does not answer the fundamental question: Why is the filing of a grievance 
an “official duty” of a teacher? The “citizen analogue” rationale leads to the conclusion 
that only public employees file grievances76—it does not reach the necessary 
71. Id. at 449.
72. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 12. In Bivens v. Trent, 
591 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2010), decided exactly three weeks earlier, the court found that the union 
grievance in question did not address a matter of public concern and so the court never reached the 
question of whether it was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.
73. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201. The current version of the New York City teachers’ contract is available at 
http://www.uft.org/files/contract_pdfs/teachers-contract-2007-2009_0.pdf. Article XXII contains the 
grievance procedure. The germane language therein is the same as it was at all times referred to herein.
74. The court also alluded to certain public policy rationales for its restrictive interpretation of the First 
Amendment. See Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201 (“The Supreme Court’s employee-speech jurisprudence 
ref lects ‘the common sense realization[s] that government offices could not function if every employment 
decision became a constitutional matter.’”) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
75. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 203.
76. See id.
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conclusion that it is an employee’s “official duty” to file a grievance. In addition, the 
court did not define the critical term of its new calculus, “official duties,” as applied 
to a public school teacher.
 David Weintraub was an untenured fifth-grade teacher in Brooklyn, New York, 
when, on November 6, 1998, a student threw a book at Weintraub during class.77 
Weintraub immediately sent the student to the assistant principal, Douglas 
Goodman, for discipline.78 Goodman promptly returned the student to Weintraub’s 
classroom without explanation.79 Upset at Goodman’s refusal to discipline the 
student and concerned about safety in his classroom, Weintraub spoke with Goodman 
and with his colleagues.80 Unsatisfied with their response, Weintraub filed a 
grievance with his union, the United Federation of Teachers.81 On July 19, 1999, the 
superintendent terminated Weintraub’s employment without explanation.82
 In July 2000, Weintraub sued the New York City Board of Education, Goodman, 
and several others in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 
claiming, among other things, retaliatory adverse employment action in violation of 
his First Amendment rights based on the grievance filing.83 On April 28, 2006, the 
district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the First Amendment claim, reasoning, in accordance with Pickering, that the content 
of Weintraub’s speech—classroom discipline—related to a matter of public concern84 
in part because Weintraub’s primary motivation was a concern for safety rather than 
77. Id. at 198. Such misconduct is labeled “Seriously Disruptive Behavior” by the New York City Department 
of Education in its Disciplinary Code and warrants a range of possible disciplinary responses from 
admonishment by the teacher to suspension by the superintendent, including reprimand by the assistant 
principal and removal from the classroom by the teacher. Furthermore, the Code provides that “[r]emoved 
students will be sent to a location within the school where they will be provided with continued educational 
services.” N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., Citywide Standards of Intervention and Discipline 
Measures: The Discipline Code and Bill of Students Rights and Responsibilities, K-12, at 13 
(2012), available at http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F7DA5E8D-C065-44FF-A16F-55F491C0B9E7/0/
DiscCode20122013FINAL.pdf (emphasis added).
78. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 198–99.
79. Id. The next school day, the same student again threw a book at Weintraub, who again sent the student 
to Goodman for discipline. Goodman again returned the student to Weintraub’s classroom.
80. Id.
81. Weintraub I, 423 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
82. Id. at 46.
83. The district court pointed out that “Weintraub faced increasingly serious charges, which were each 
successively determined unfounded, after speaking to Goodman about Goodman’s failure to discipline 
the student.” Id. at 52–53.
84. Id. at 51. Weintraub had previously sought judicial review of his termination in state court, claiming 
that the termination was retaliation for his having served the board with a notice of claim related to his 
1999 arrest. Id. at 48. The court, however, found that Weintraub was “unable to generate any evidence 
that his termination was retaliatory.” Id. However, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument 
in Weintraub I that the adverse finding in that proceeding collaterally estopped Weintraub from 
litigating his claim before the district court. The district court held that “preclusive effect is not given to 
the issue litigated in the Article 78 proceeding because the issue that was in question at [that] proceeding 
is distinct from the issues presented to this court.” Id.
919
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
personal gain. Therefore, the court held his speech, in the form of the grievance, to 
be protected by the First Amendment.85
 On May 29, 2007, the defendants moved for reconsideration in light of the 
Garcetti decision, which had been issued one year earlier.86 Applying Garcetti ’s 
“pursuant to official duties” standard, the district court concluded that the First 
Amendment did not protect a union grievance because, in filing the grievance, 
Weintraub was speaking as an employee “proceeding through official channels to 
complain about unsatisfactory working conditions.”87 The district court held that it 
was compelled by Garcetti to find that the filing of the grievance is “no longer [a] 
viable bas[i]s for a First Amendment retaliation claim.”88 At the same time, the court 
acknowledged that the Second Circuit had not yet addressed this issue and that it 
might reasonably conclude that “while Weintraub’s act of sending the book-throwing 
student to Goodman for discipline was clearly required by his official duties, his 
duties as a teacher did not require him to take any further steps such as . . . 
commencing a dispute-resolution proceeding.”89
 The Second Circuit did not so conclude, however. On November 25, 2008, the 
Second Circuit, in a two-to-one decision affirmed that the district court’s decision 
that Weintraub’s filing of a grievance was made pursuant to Weintraub’s official 
duties and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment.90
iV.  garCEtti in AppLicAtiOn: thE citiZEn AnALOgUE And OfficiAL dUtiEs 
anaLYsEs
 Following Weintraub III in 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York noted in Adams v. New York State Education Department that 
“[a]pplying Garcetti, the Second Circuit has declared that ‘speech can be made 
“pursuant to” a public employee’s official job duties even though it is not required by, 
or included in, the employee’s job description, or in response to a request by the 
employer.’”91 This raises two questions about how the First Amendment applies to 
the filing of a union grievance by public employees: (1) What determines an 
employee’s “official duties”?; and (2) how can the filing of a union grievance constitute 
an employee’s “official duty”?
85. Id. at 52.
86. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
87. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2010).
88. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
89. Id. at 222.
90. Id. at 206. The court did so expressly by following Garcetti, but without addressing the possibility raised 
by the district court. On October 18, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Weintraub’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 131 S. Ct. 444 (2010). 
91. Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Weintraub III, 
593 F.3d at 203) (emphasis added).
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 Where, or at least how, an “official duties” determination fits into the analysis 
was left unclear in Garcetti. The Garcetti court did not provide an explicit framework 
for determining which expressions should be granted First Amendment protection 
and which should not. In his dissent in Weintraub III, Judge Calabresi, distinguishing 
Garcetti, noted that “[t]he memo that Ceballos wrote was not merely related to his 
job duties, but rather it was the very thing he was paid by the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s Office to do.”92 The same cannot be said for Weintraub’s grievance 
filing. Indeed, as Judge Calabresi pointed out, the Board of Education “did not in 
any way depend on Weintraub bringing union grievances or refraining from bringing 
them.”93 On the contrary, Judge Calabresi asserted that he doubts “that most 
employers would view union activity as something that their employees do for the 
employer’s benefit,” noting the “distinct irony in the idea that unions, which so many 
employers seek to exclude from the workplace, are somehow transmuted into entities 
that ‘promote the employer’s mission’” when filing grievances.94
 In Garcetti, the official duties determination was made pursuant to an assessment 
of whether there existed a “citizen analogue” to the form of speech in question. This 
led the Supreme Court to a conclusion about the status of the employee at the time 
the speech was made: private citizen or public employee.
 A. The Form of the Workplace Speech: The Citizen Analogue to a Union Grievance
 Although the Pickering Court referenced the private citizen versus public 
employee distinction, the genesis of the Garcetti Court’s determination of whether 
the speaker was speaking as a private citizen at the time the speech was made is the 
Court’s decision in Connick v. Myers. The Garcetti Court expressly observed that 
“Connick instructs courts to begin by considering whether the expressions in question 
were made by the speaker ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern.’”95 The Court 
based this conclusion about Connick on its interpretation of a single sentence in 
Connick:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of 
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is 
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s 
behavior.96
92. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 208.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 209.
95. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 416 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 
(1983)).
96. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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However, the Garcetti Court’s emphasis on the “citizen” piece of that statement is not 
supported by the text or context of the Connick decision.97 The Court in Connick 
drew that distinction to highlight the nature of the interest at stake—personal versus 
public—not the status of the speaker. Indeed, the Court in Connick focused entirely 
on whether the speech in question addressed a matter of public concern and did not 
inquire into the speaker’s status as a citizen.98
 This status determination in Garcetti was made by assessing whether the speaker 
was speaking pursuant to his official duties at the time the speech in question was 
made.99 This was a dispositive determination for the Court because “[e]mployees 
who make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties 
retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of 
activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”100 However, 
“[w]hen a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there 
is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.”101 
This “citizen analogue” thus became a determinative indicator of speaker status in 
the workplace speech analysis.
 But Ceballos’s situation was fundamentally different from that of Pickering, 
Givhan, and Weintraub in ways that call for a different legal analysis—one that 
considers the form of the speech and, in addition, that does not rely on the existence 
of a “citizen analogue” to such speech, as the Court did in Garcetti.102 First, in writing 
the memo to his supervisor regarding a case his office was handling, Ceballos was 
performing work he was paid to do; in asserting their complaints, the other four 
plaintiffs were not.103 Second, in Weintraub’s case the speech took the form of a 
union grievance and, when an employee files a grievance, he is not speaking for the 
employer; he is speaking for himself to the employer, invoking the rights accorded to 
him by his union contract and protected by law for the reasons discussed earlier in 
Part II.B. Weintraub’s situation is thus factually distinguishable from Garcetti—
97. Id. at 147–48. This is notwithstanding the Court’s announcement in Connick that
[a]lthough today the balance is struck for the government, this is no defeat for the First 
Amendment. For it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free 
expression if the Amendment’s safeguarding of a public employee’s right, as a citizen, to 
participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to 
constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented here.
 Id. at 154.
98. Id. at 148–50.
99. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
100. Id. at 423.
101. Id. at 424.
102. Id.
103. See Part III infra. The Court in Garcetti implies the importance of this point to its analysis (“Ceballos 
wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he . . . was employed to do.”). Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 421.
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indeed, from all of the aforementioned cases—and therefore calls for a legal analysis 
that accounts for the form of the speech but does not require the “citizen analogue.”
 Judging from its treatment by the lower courts, this “citizen analogue” rationale 
is one of the seemingly less controversial aspects of the Court’s decision in Garcetti.104 
But this note argues that this rationale is one of Garcetti ’s great red herrings and 
should be inapplicable in workplace speech cases involving speech in the form of 
union grievances, i.e., those cases where the form of the speech is legally protected by 
labor law regardless of its subject. The citizen analogue inquiry is the doctrinal 
manifestation in Garcetti of the Court’s new focus on the “citizen” element of 
“speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”
 The “citizen analogue” as an independent consideration in the analysis took hold 
after Garcetti. In Foley v. Town of Randolph, for example, the court focused on the 
context of a fireman-employee’s speech complaining about fire department resources, 
delivered in uniform at a press conference convened by the fire marshal at the scene 
of a fire, though the court conceded “neither of these factors is dispositive.”105 
Ultimately, the court ruled against the employee, finding “no relevant analogue” to 
citizen speech to speaking at a press conference.106 But speaking at a press conference 
is very different from filing a contract grievance, and not just because Foley was 
being paid to speak, but because he was speaking for, not to, his employer, as is the 
case with a union grievance. Furthermore, the First Circuit in Foley articulated 
something of a bright-line rule when it noted that “the fact that Foley was ostensibly 
evaluated on whether he ‘[i]nteracts well with the media’ suggests that speaking to 
the press is a duty he ‘actually [was] expected to perform.’”107
 Similarly, sixteen months later, in Jackler v. Byrne, the Second Circuit applied the 
“citizen analogue” analysis as a determinative factor in a workplace speech case.108 In 
Jackler, the court found that the plaintiff, a probationary police officer, had suffered 
retaliation for refusing to make false statements concerning a civilian claim of police 
brutality against his colleagues. The court agreed with the plaintiff that Garcetti and 
Weintraub were not dispositive in precluding First Amendment protection on the 
grounds that the citizen analogue requirement was satisfied and because Garcetti and 
104. See, e.g., Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2011); Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010); Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010); Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 
1345 (11th Cir. 2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006). But see Weintraub III, 593 
F.3d at 206 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The idea that the existence of citizen analogues is a prerequisite 
for suit seems contradicted by Garcetti ’s statement that the fact that a public employee ‘expressed his 
views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive.’”).
105. Foley, 598 F.3d at 7.
106. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
107. Foley, 598 F.3d at 7.
108. 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying 
Garcetti in case of former FBI agent fired for refusing to give false testimony against a colleague). On 
February 27, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases. See Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S. 
Ct. 1634 (2012); Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
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Weintraub did not preclude First Amendment protection for refusing to speak falsely.109 
The court thus distinguished Ceballos’s affirmative speech from Jackler’s affirmative 
refusal to speak.110 Consistent with its decision in Weintraub III, the Second Circuit 
in Jackler again applied a citizen analogue analysis, reaffirming that Weintraub’s 
grievance had “no relevant analogue to citizen speech,”111 but finding that Jackler’s 
refusal to speak, in effect, did have an analogue.112
 When a public employee possesses information on a matter of public concern, the 
public has an interest in disclosure of that information and the status of the speaker, 
whether as a public employee or private citizen, when disclosing that information 
should not supersede that interest. With regard to union grievances, it should not 
matter whether the public has an analogous mechanism for communicating the 
information that is the subject of a union grievance filed by a public employee. If the 
subject of the speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court should disregard 
the fact that the speech is made in the form of a grievance and focus instead on 
balancing the public’s right to receive such information with the rights of the public 
employer in the efficient operation of the services it provides.
 B. The Subject Matter of the Workplace Speech: Pursuant to Official Duties
 A linchpin of the “citizen analogue” inquiry is the inscrutable, inchoate concept 
of “official duties.” Breaking from the Pickering inquiry, the Supreme Court in 
Garcetti announced that speech made “pursuant to” a public employee’s “official 
duties” was categorically unprotected by the First Amendment because the employee 
was not speaking in his capacity as a citizen.113 In other words, if the speech by a 
109. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 234–37.
110. Id. at 232.
111. Id. at 238 (quoting Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010)).
112. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241 (“[A] citizen has a First Amendment right to decide what to say and what not to 
say, and, accordingly, the right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make statements he believes 
are false.”). Ultimately, the court found Jackler’s refusal to recant his honest testimony and replace it with 
false testimony to have a “clear civilian analogue” and that he was “not simply doing his job.” The court 
asserted that “it is clear that the First Amendment protects the rights of a citizen to refuse to retract a 
report to the police that he believes is true, to refuse to make a statement that he believes is false, and to 
refuse to engage in unlawful conduct by filing a false report with the police.” Id. at 241–42.
113. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Court began its analysis with the premise: “When a 
citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her 
freedom.” Id. at 418. It added a second premise: “Public employees . . . often occupy trusted positions in 
society. When they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the 
proper performance of governmental functions.” Id. at 418–19. The Court continued its analysis by noting 
that “[t]he First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship 
to restrict . . . the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” Id. at 419. The Court 
concluded that its task is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when 
employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers 
attempting to perform their important public functions.” Id. at 420. Finally, and most apropos to the focus 
of this note, the Court asserted that “[u]nderlying our cases has been the premise that while the First 
Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to ‘constitutionalize 
the employee grievance.’” Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
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public employee is pursuant to her official duties, the court no longer reaches the 
question of whether her speech addressed a matter of public concern. This official 
duties inquiry reduces the scope of First Amendment protection for public employees. 
But by failing to define its two key terms—“pursuant to” and “official duties”—the 
Court provided little guidance to the lower courts in administering this new test,114 
which has led to conflicting opinions.115
 Weintraub is one such example. The Second Circuit in Weintraub III professes to 
be following Garcetti, but in doing so the court in fact employs language both 
semantically distinct from that in Garcetti and undefined at key points in its decision. 
For instance, the Second Circuit’s “in furtherance of core duties” standard in 
Weintraub III was not the standard employed by the court in Garcetti.116 “In 
furtherance of ” and “pursuant to” are not synonymous.117 In addition, the court does 
not define what it means by Weintraub’s “core duties.”118 It also fails to explain 
whether “core duties” are synonymous with or distinct from “official duties” (the 
Garcetti term) or perhaps are a subset of them. If they are distinct, then the Garcetti 
analysis does not apply. While it is unclear whether these semantic differences would 
114. To further confuse matters, at others points in the decision the Court claims to be restricting speech 
that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis 
added).
115. See Lindsey v. Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2007); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 66, 
647–48 (7th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 
468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006); Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109–10 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394–99 (D. Conn. 2006). Compare Gonzales v. City of 
Chicago, 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001) with Delgado v. Jones, 95 F. App’x 185 (7th Cir. 2004). See also 
Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 262 Educ. L. Rep. 357, 358–59 (2011) (“Most circuits have impermissibly read the 
Garcetti rule to impose a much broader exemption that the Court recognized, and that this misapplication 
stems from a failure of these lower courts to recognize the restrictive function of the words ‘pursuant to’ 
in the context of the facts before the Garcetti Court.”); Chohan, supra note 19, at 575 n.26 (“Garcetti is 
overly broad, lacks predictability, and leaves too much speech unprotected. . . . Predictably, different 
courts have taken different approaches to this analysis.”) (citing Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career 
Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (2006)); Elzer, supra note 19, at 367 (“The Court’s failure to articulate an 
‘official duties’ test has caused lower courts to interpret Garcetti in many different, and sometimes 
conflicting, ways.”).
116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
117. “Pursuant to” is defined as “in carrying out; in conformity with; according to.” Pursuant to—Definition 
and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pursuant%20to (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Furtherance” is defined as “the act of furthering; 
advancement.” Furtherance—Definition and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/furtherance (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Duty” is defined, in relevant 
part, as “obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions that arise from one’s position.” Duty—Definition 
and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/duty (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
118. This particular confusion has arisen in other circuits as well. See, e.g., Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826 
(7th Cir. 2008). In Trigillo, the Seventh Circuit announced that “[b]efore Garcetti, we held that speech 
consistent with an employee’s general duties, but not part of her ‘core functions,’ deserved constitutional 
protection. But Garcetti required us to abandon this proposition.” Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
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lead to a different result, the undefined doctrinal terms have resulted in loose and 
inconsistent applications by courts.
 In Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, for example, the Tenth 
Circuit held that speech made pursuant to “official duties” may “concern[] an unusual 
aspect of an employee’s job that is not part of his everyday functions.”119 The court 
applied a five-step Garcetti/Pickering analysis,120 and found that some of the teachers’ 
numerous grievances were not made pursuant to their official duties because, for 
example, some of the speech in question “occurred after hours and outside the 
Academy[,] . . . [and] the discussions included ordinary citizens . . . who were not 
employed by the Academy.”121 “[I]f an employee engages in speech during the course 
of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates 
the employee’s performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties.”122 By equating “pursuant to” with “reasonably contributes 
to” and “facilitates,” the court arguably greatly broadened the scope of the Garcetti 
First Amendment protection exclusion.
 Furthermore, the Brammer-Hoelter court asserted that “not all speech that occurs 
at work is made pursuant to an employee’s official duties. Nor is all speech about the 
subject matter of an employee’s work necessarily made pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties.”123 Where the teachers lodged their complaints formally with the 
school’s board of education pursuant to the board’s policy and direction, the court 
found that, since the teachers “were encouraged to present their view to improve the 
[school] and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the Board,” the court 
“cannot deem such a generalized grievance policy to be an official duty without 
119. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Battle v. 
Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006)).
120. The court held that:
[f]irst, the court must determine whether the employee speaks “pursuant to [his] official 
duties.” If the employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, then there is no 
constitutional protection because the restriction on speech “simply ref lects the exercise 
of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Second, 
if an employee does not speak pursuant to his official duties, but instead speaks as a 
citizen, the court must determine whether the subject of the speech is a matter of public 
concern. If the speech is not a matter of public concern, then the speech is unprotected 
and the inquiry ends. Third, if the employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, the court must determine “whether the employee’s interest in commenting on 
the issue outweighs the interest of the state as employer.” Fourth, assuming the 
employee’s interest outweighs that of the employer, the employee must show that his 
speech was a “substantial factor or a motivating factor in a detrimental employment 
decision.” Finally, if the employee establishes that his speech was such a factor, “the 
employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the same action against the 
employee even in the absence of the protected speech.”
 Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202–03 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 1205. The court lists twelve grievances, but it is clear from that list that the court focused only on 
the subject of those grievances and not at all on the form or forum in which they were communicated.
122. Id. at 1203.
123. Id. at 1204 (citations omitted).
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eviscerating Garcetti and the general constitutional principle that ‘public employees 
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.’”124 
Moreover, according to the First Circuit in Decotiis, the Brammer-Hoelter court held 
“that the teachers’ speech was citizen speech because it occurred after hours and 
outside of the workplace, the teachers ‘had no supervisory responsibility and no duty 
to report with regard to any of the problems being discussed,’ and the discussion 
included members of the public.”125
 Most of the same could be said about David Weintraub’s speech. Union 
grievances are typically filed after hours and Weintraub owed no duty to his employer 
to file the grievance. But that did not seem to influence the decision in Weintraub. 
The district court in its first decision, Weintraub I, concluded that the court “is to 
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”126 
But the court then concluded that “it is clear that Weintraub’s . . . filing the formal 
grievance [is] not protected speech under the Garcetti Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment.”127 The district court, upon reconsideration following the Garcetti 
opinion, in Weintraub II, noted that
the general principle running through [the] cases applying Garcetti to similar 
situations is that, when a public employee airs a complaint or grievance, or 
expresses concern about misconduct, to his or her immediate supervisor or 
pursuant to a clear duty to report imposed by law or employer policy, he or she is 
speaking as an employee and not as a citizen.128
However, this does not apply to contract grievances because an employee is never 
compelled to file a grievance.129
 Additionally, the district court continued that “[i]f, however, the employee goes 
outside of the established institutional channels in order to express a complaint or 
concern, the employee is speaking as a citizen, and the speech is protected.”130 But 
124. Id. at 1204 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006)).
125. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 33 n.12 (1st Cir. 2011).
126. Weintraub I, 423 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
569 (1968)).
127. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
128. Id (emphasis added). The court here appears to be using the term “grievance” in a colloquial sense as 
opposed to the term of art in a labor setting where it refers, as in Weintraub, specifically to a formal part of 
a collectively bargained employment dispute resolution procedure. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, 
Reconciling Differences: The Theory and Law of Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 Indus. Rel. L.J. 523 (1987).
129. New York State’s Taylor Law, for example, speaks in terms of employee “rights,” not “obligations.” 
Specifically, section 203 guarantees public employees “the right to . . . the administration of grievances 
arising” under a collective bargaining agreement. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 203 (McKinney 2011).
130. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
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the court does not define what it means by “institutional channels.”131 Regardless, a 
collectively bargained grievance procedure, negotiated in accordance with, and 
protected by, applicable labor law, is not an “institutional channel.”132 Instead, it is a 
dispute resolution mechanism mutually agreed upon by the employer and the 
union—an external organization independent from the employer.133 Indeed, although 
the lack of a citizen analogue should not preclude First Amendment protection, for a 
range of workplace-related disputes, the contract grievance is often the only option 
available to an employee to get to an arbiter outside of the workplace.134 In Weintraub, 
the district court confuses “institutional channels,” which implies unilateral 
employer-created policies and mechanisms associated with the employer organization, 
with “official channels,” which more broadly suggests a formally sanctioned 
collectively bargained mechanism.135
 This confusion is highlighted by the district court’s description of the grievance 
procedure as “a formal dispute-resolution process put in place by his employer.”136 In fact, 
in the case of Weintraub the grievance procedure is a mandatory subject of bargaining 
that was negotiated by the union with the city of New York.137 It would violate New 
York’s Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act for a public employer to unilaterally 
institute a grievance procedure for unionized employees without negotiation with a 
duly certified union.138 The court of appeals picks up on and develops this confusion 
131. This omission has created further confusion in the courts. See, e.g., Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141–42 (“As several courts in this Circuit have noted, this factor . . . appears 
to be interchangeably referred to as the ‘relevant analogue’ or ‘institutional channels’ factor.”).
132. Section 158(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute 
financial or other support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006). 
133. “Institutional” suggests some practice or thing associated with or connected to an institution. 
Institutional—Definitions and More, Merriam-Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/institutional (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Official” suggests a practice or thing formally 
sanctioned. Official—Definitions and More, Merriam-Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/official (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). A collective bargaining agreement, including its 
grievance provisions, is no more associated with an “institutional” employer than it is with a labor 
union, which exists wholly independent of, and external to, the institution for which its members work.
134. See generally 20 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 55:61 (4th ed. 2011) (“The general 
rule is that an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of 
grievances may not maintain a civil action for damages in the case of an alleged breach of the agreement, 
but must instead look to the union for a remedy provided by the contractual grievance procedure.”) 
(citations omitted).
135. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 219–20; see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2011). 
136. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (emphasis added).
137. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, Mandatory/Non-mandatory 
Subjects of Negotiation 93 (2009) (“Grievance procedures are terms and conditions of employment 
and, thus, mandatorily negotiable.”).
138. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209-a(1)(d) (McKinney 2011) (“It shall be an improper practice for public 
employer [sic] or its agents deliberately . . . (d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees . . . .”). This is true for all public sector 
unions in New York State, in accordance with the Taylor Law.
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in Weintraub III. Its description of a union grievance as an “internal communication”139 
is “dubious,” as Judge Calabresi observes in his dissenting opinion.140 As Judge 
Calabresi also correctly notes, the United Federation of Teachers is an external body141 
and the filing of a contractual grievance is a protected activity under municipal, state, 
and federal labor laws.142 Furthermore, grievance procedures do not constitute internal 
school policy, are not subject to employer discretion, and are not considered a 
management right.143 Therefore, they cannot be considered either institutional or 
internal to the place of government employment. If the activity is itself legally 
protected against adverse employment consequences, then no retaliatory consequences 
should follow the engagement in such activity. Reading the First Amendment as not 
protecting the filing of union grievances effectively results in an end-run around those 
labor laws and the protections they provide for such activity.
 Moreover, Judge Calabresi highlights a critical distinction unaddressed by the 
majority, noting that he
take[s] it as a given that Weintraub’s duties entailed informing the school 
administration of violent incidents, such as those at the root of this case, as a 
means of facilitating the school’s disciplinary apparatus. This justifies the 
district court’s holding that Weintraub’s comments to his supervisor were not 
protected. But grieving the administration’s response through his union is quite 
another matter.144
Indeed, the majority never states why, by filing a grievance, Weintraub was speaking 
pursuant to his official duties apart from finding that no citizen analogue existed. 
The district court stated that “Weintraub’s conversations with other teachers about 
his conflict with Goodman . . . are clearly not within the scope of his employment 
duties.”145 The court concluded that, “when speaking to his co-workers about his 
concerns regarding school safety and Goodman’s handling of the book-throwing 
incidents, Weintraub was speaking as a citizen rather than as an employee.”146 But 
the court fails to explain why it considers his conversations with his colleagues as 
materially different and distinct from his conversation with Goodman, which it 
found to be within the scope of his duties. The only apparent distinction is that 
139. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 206 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011).
140. Id. at 206 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
141. Id. 
142. See infra text accompanying note 157.
143. See the New York City teachers’ collective bargaining agreement. Contract, United Federation of 
Teachers 2007–2009 (2007), available at http://www.uft.org/f iles/contract_pdfs/teachers-
contract-2007-2009_0.pdf. Article XXII contains the grievance procedure.
144. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added).
145. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Indeed, it is not at all clear why filing a 
grievance about school safety is “clearly” within a teacher’s “official duties” while conferring with 
colleagues about school safety is not.
146. Id.
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Weintraub believed that Goodman, his supervisor, could do something about the 
problem and that his colleagues could not.
 As a matter of public policy, this is problematic because of the disincentive it 
creates. Finding its hands tied, the district court concluded:
[t]hough it questions the wisdom of a constitutional policy that disincentivizes 
public employees from bringing serious misconduct and abuse to the attention 
of their superiors, while perversely encouraging them to take every internal 
conf lict to the highest levels of governmental oversight, this [c]ourt must 
nevertheless apply the Garcetti rule in good faith until the Supreme Court 
sees fit to revisit the issue.147
In summarizing the then-current state of the circuit courts on the question, the 
district court observed that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion may exist” 
because
while Weintraub’s act of sending the book-throwing student to Goodman for 
discipline was clearly required by his official duties, his duties as a teacher did 
not require him to take any further steps such as approaching Goodman 
about the situation or commencing a dispute-resolution proceeding. The 
supererogatory nature of those subsequent actions may prove sufficient to 
sustain the view that Weintraub was not acting pursuant to any duty when he 
performed those actions, and that his speech was therefore protected.148
This is relevant because, as the court of appeals noted, quoting Garcetti, the “proper 
inquiry” into whether Weintraub was acting pursuant to his official duties “is a 
practical one.”149 The Court in Garcetti equated such duties with those the “employee 
actually is expected to perform.”150 But despite this fundamental recognition of the 
distinction between form and subject, the district court found Weintraub’s speech 
unprotected.
 C.  Conflation of the Form and Subject Matter Analyses in Workplace Speech Cases: 
The Union Grievance
 A concurrent problem contributing to, and arguably underpinning, the union-
grievance-as-official-duties canard is the apparent confusion of the form (union 
grievance/citizen analogue requirement) and subject matter (private vs. public interest/ 
“pursuant to official duties” requirement) of the employee speech in judicial analysis. 
Judging from Pickering and its progeny, there is no dispute that the subject matter of 
the employee speech—specifically, whether it addresses a matter of public concern—
is a fundamental part of the First Amendment analysis.151 Indeed, it constitutes the 
147. Id.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
150. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
151. Prior to Garcetti it was not a part of a status assessment of the speaker (i.e., public employee/private 
citizen). In Givhan, for example, Justice Rehnquist announced that “[w]hen a teacher speaks publicly, it is 
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first inquiry in a Pickering analysis. What is less clear is whether the form that the 
speech takes—for example, a union grievance—is relevant to that analysis at all. 
Particularly unclear is whether the form is relevant to the initial assessment of 
speaker’s status as a citizen or a public employee, now explicitly required as a separate 
inquiry under Garcetti.
 Courts addressing the question of public employee speech have taken note of the 
form of the speech, but this was generally in the context of examining whether the 
employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern.152 In Garcetti, however, the 
form of the speech became a significant and determinative factor in the status 
assessment of the speaker, and thus ultimately dispositive in the First Amendment 
analysis.153 Likewise, the Weintraub court focused on the form of the speech when it 
stated that, by filing a grievance with his union, Weintraub “was speaking pursuant 
to his official duties.”154 And “because Weintraub made his statements ‘pursuant to’ 
his official duties as a schoolteacher . . . his speech was not protected.”155 The court 
thus never reached the question of whether the subject of Weintraub’s speech 
addressed a matter of public concern.156 In other words, for the Second Circuit 
engaging in the first step of a Garcetti analysis, it was the form of Weintraub’s speech 
generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine whether they ‘in any way either 
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with the 
regular operation of the schools generally.’” Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 
(1979) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968)). Similarly, the First Circuit in 
Mercado-Berrios, citing Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010), noted that “[t]he relevant 
inquiry under Garcetti . . . has two basic components . . . both of which are highly context-sensitive.” 
Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 
F.3d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added); see also McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 19, at 232 
(stating that “the forum is not dispositive in identifying whether the comments are pursuant to job duties” 
and that “lower courts observed that determining whether a public employee’s expression is protected 
requires a ‘fact-sensitive, context-specific balancing of competing interests”). But see Stahura-Uhl v. 
Iroquois Cent. Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 132 (2011) (holding that special education teacher spoke 
pursuant to her official duties when she complained to coworkers and students’ parents about deprivation 
of resources for students and could thus not avail herself of First Amendment protection).
152. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (letter to the editor); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) 
(internal office questionnaire); Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F. 3d 158, 161 
(2d Cir. 2006) (letter to supervisor); Montle v. Westwood Heights Sch. Dist., 437 F. Supp. 2d 652, 653 
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (T-shirt with pro-union message).
153. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (asserting that the subject matter of Ceballos’s memo was “nondispositive”).
154. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201.
155. Id. at 205.
156. In support of this view of the form of speech, the Second Circuit favorably cites Boyce v. Andrew in 
which the Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he form and context in which the [plaintiffs’] complaints were 
made are indicative of the fact that they intended to address only matters connected with their jobs.” Id. 
at 204 (citing Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2007)). From this assertion, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the “form and context” in which the speech was made in Boyce—an 
internal communication to a supervisor—“weighed against First Amendment protection” in that case. 
Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 204. In fact, however, the Eleventh Circuit in Boyce focused primarily on the 
subject matter of the plaintiffs’ speech in arriving at the conclusion that it was made pursuant to their 
official duties. Boyce, 510 F.3d at 1344–46.
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(union grievance), not its subject matter (school safety), which determined that he 
had spoken as an employee rather than as a citizen, and thus disqualified his speech 
from First Amendment protection. The problem with this analysis is that the union 
grievance is a form of speech legally protected by labor law regardless of its subject.157 
Therein too lies a logical fallacy of the Second Circuit’s reasoning:
Major Premise:  Employee speech made pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties is not protected by the First Amendment.
Minor Premise: Only employees can file union grievances.
Conclusion:  Union grievances constitute speech pursuant to an 
employee’s official duties and is unprotected by the 
First Amendment.
The first two premises, at least after Garcetti, are valid. To accept the court’s conclusion, 
however, is to assume a third premise: employees file union grievances pursuant to 
their official duties. But this is false. The Second Circuit nonetheless assumed the 
validity of this third premise, without explanation or rationale, which was necessary in 
supporting its conclusion. This confusion of form and subject, and especially the 
misplaced focus on the form of the speech in the threshold inquiry, renders this First 
Amendment analysis critically flawed in connection with the union grievance.158
 So ingrained is this analytical confusion, in fact, that even where the courts find 
the challenged speech to be protected, they nevertheless seem compelled to conflate 
subject and form. In Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, for example, 
the court asserted that “[n]early all of the matters Plaintiffs claim they discussed were 
made pursuant to their duties as teachers.”159 But a “matter” (i.e., a subject) cannot be 
“made” (much less made pursuant to a duty).160
157. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–59 (2006); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 204, 208, 
209-a (New York State’s Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, or “Taylor Law”) (McKinney 2011). 
In addition, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 12-306(a)(3) makes it an improper practice for a public 
employer or its agents to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or 
discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities of, any public employee organization. The 
New York City Board of Collective Bargaining has jurisdiction over disputes involving this section of 
New York City Administrative Code. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 205(5)(d) (2009).
158. The confusion is not just among the courts. See R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in 
Today’s Workplace, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 749, 766 (2011) (“It may be assumed that filing such a union 
grievance is indeed part of one’s job, within one’s realistic job description . . . .”). Paul Forster falls into 
the typical post-Garcetti trap in Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching 
in Public Schools. Forster conf lates (or at least equates) a teacher’s “official duties” with her “official 
teaching duties,” which leads to his analytical confusion of subject and form. See Paul Forster, Teaching 
in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 687, 
696 (2011). But see Elzer, supra note 19, at 378 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
Elzer notes that “it is far from ‘clear’ what part of Freitag’s job duties required her to be subjected to 
sexual harassment, let alone to report it,” and that “the effect of the [Freitag decision] is to strip all 
internal grievances of First Amendment protection, regardless of their truth or importance.”
159. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
160. In other words, one may “make” a complaint, where the act of and/or forum for complaining is “part-
and-parcel” of one’s employment duties, regardless of the subject matter of the complaint. Vice versa: one 
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 This confusion of form and subject, and especially the misplaced focus on the 
form of the speech in the threshold inquiry, renders the First Amendment analysis 
centered on the citizen analogue inquiry inapt in connection with the union 
grievance.161
 One apparent exception is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Dallas 
Independent School District, in which a school district discharged an athletic director 
after he issued a memorandum asserting the misuse of public school funds.162 While 
the Fifth Circuit found this speech unprotected because it was “made in the course of 
performing his employment,” the court explained that “[u]nder Garcetti, we must 
shift our focus from the content of the speech to the role the speaker occupied when 
he said it . . . Ceballos was acting pursuant to his official duties because he was 
performing activities required to fulfill his duties.”163 But the Williams court 
distinguished Williams’s situation because the employer conceded “that an Athletic 
Director is not required to write memoranda to his principal regarding athletic 
accounts.”164 The court asserted that it “must determine the extent to which, under 
Garcetti, a public employee is protected by the First Amendment if his speech is not 
necessarily required by his job duties but nevertheless is related to his job duties.”165 
But the court did not indicate why it must pursue that inquiry, which it explained 
was beyond the scope of Garcetti.166
 A related manifestation of this confusion is found in the misplaced focus on the 
underlying event rather than on the immediately precipitating event. Weintraub was 
not retaliated against—indeed, did not claim retaliation—for his failure to maintain 
order and discipline in his classroom (the underlying event/fact); he was retaliated 
against for filing a grievance (the immediately precipitating event).167 This is sloppy 
legal analysis, particularly when the court: (1) offers no rationale for the assertion, 
and nevertheless dismisses the plaintiff ’s First Amendment claims; and (2) finds that 
may complain where the subject is clearly related—indeed, closely related—to the employee’s duties, but 
may utilize a forum (such as a contractual grievance procedure) that nevertheless leaves the “speech” 
protected. But one may not “make” a matter, subject, or topic. This is semantically, and by extension 
conceptually, f lawed.
161. See supra note 158.
162. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
163. Id. at 692–94.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 693. The Williams court articulated one of the more expansive definitions of “official duties” when 
it equated “[a]ctivities undertaken in the course of performing one’s job” with “activities pursuant to 
official duties.” Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 692.
167. See also Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), in which the court 
conf lated the underlying fact (falsif ication of records) with the immediately precipitating event 
(complaint) in erroneously, and conclusorily, holding that the complaint was unprotected speech. In 
other words, the Adams court implicitly equated “part-and-parcel of a teacher’s concerns as a teacher” 
with that teacher’s “official duties” as a teacher.
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absent a “relevant analogue” to speech by private citizens, public employees speak 
pursuant to their official duties, and are thus unprotected by the First Amendment.168
  1.  Union Grievance: A Form of Speech That Should Never Constitute Speech 
“Pursuant to an Official Duty”
 This note argues that the filing of a union contract grievance should never be 
found to constitute an “official duty” of any public employee and thus should not 
preclude First Amendment protection under the first step of the Garcetti test. As 
previously noted, this is partly because the filing of a union grievance, in accordance 
with a collectively bargained grievance procedure, is protected by state and federal 
labor law.169
 In Weintraub II, in support of its position that Weintraub’s claims were barred 
because his statements were made in his capacity as an employee, the City argued 
that “[o]bviously, it is within the job duties of any teacher to maintain discipline 
within the classroom, and Weintraub’s referral of the student to Goodman . . . falls 
within these duties.”170
 But, apropos Weintraub, grievance filing is not—and has never been—part of a 
teacher’s official duties.171 Indeed, Judge Calabresi in his Weintraub dissent suggests 
that grievance filing is hostile to a school district’s interests and by extension, is at 
least arguably hostile to the interests of any public employer.172 Because grievance 
filing is not part of a teacher’s official duties, even very broadly defined, it must not 
be summarily precluded from First Amendment protection even while it is also 
expressly protected under state and federal labor law.173 More broadly, this means 
that no adverse employment action should be taken against a public employee for 
exercising her right to file a union grievance. “Utilization of the grievance process is 
a ‘protected activity,’ and interference with the exercise of that right is an improper 
practice.”174 Otherwise the National Labor Relations Act and by extension New 
York’s Taylor Law contain meaningless provisions and the determination that the 
168. Id. at 428 (quoting Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 203).
169. See discussion supra Part II.B; supra note 157.
170. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
171. See N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3001 et seq. (McKinney 2011); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 30, 
100 et seq. (McKinney 2011). Although teacher duties are not codified in New York State, standard 
industry practices, in New York and around the country, have nonetheless emerged over the years. 
Teachers prepare for class, teach class, respond to and grade student work, assist students in need, or 
desirous, of extra help; they staff committees, supervise student acstivities, etc. With the notable 
exception of certain statutory mandated reporting obligations, public school teachers have no civil 
obligation to notify their employer of any concerns, malfeasance, grievances or complaints.
172. See Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 209 n.6.
173. See supra text accompanying note 157.
174. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n, Public Sector Labor & Employment Law 293 (1998) (citing Bd. of Educ. 
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 5, Half Hollow Hills, 6 PERB 3034 (1973), aff ’d on other grounds sub. nom. 
Frank v. PERB, 384 N.Y.S.2d 705, 9 PERB 7012 (2d Dep’t 1976); see also N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 203, 
204, 208, 209-a (2008).
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First Amendment does not protect the filing of union grievances effectively results 
in a circumvention of the labor laws which expressly protect such activity. In 
Weintraub III, the court could have given effect to both the U.S. Constitution and 
New York State law by finding either that filing a union grievance constitutes 
protected activity under state law and so Garcetti is inapplicable, or that filing a 
union grievance is consistent with the types of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.
 No court applying the Garcetti test has asserted that the filing of a union 
grievance is a legally unprotected activity. In fact, those courts that have addressed 
the question at all have typically done so with conclusory pronouncements implying 
the self-evidence that such filing is an “official duty.”175 Generally this assertion is 
based on the perceived lack of “citizen analogue” to the chosen form of speech. In 
Weintraub III for instance, the Second Circuit concluded, without further explanation, 
that Weintraub’s filing of a grievance in accordance with his union’s collective 
bargaining agreement was part of his official duties176 because the court found that 
the grievance “constituted ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns about his ability to 
properly perform his duties.’”177
 This interpretation seems to imply that, depending on their subject matter, some 
union grievances might be considered official duties and others might not. However, 
this contradicts the court’s earlier broad assertion incorporating the filing of a 
grievance among a teacher’s official duties. Most schoolteachers, presumably, go 
through their entire careers without ever filing a contractual union grievance. It is 
hard to imagine that most—indeed any—go through their entire careers without 
confronting some issue which might be worthy of at least informal complaint. Does 
this mean that most work a full career without ever fulfilling their official duties?
 Nevertheless, Decotiis significantly narrowed Garcetti, holding that “[i]n 
identifying Plaintiff ’s official responsibilities,” the court must focus “on ‘the duties 
an employee is actually expected to perform.’”178 Further, the court found that 
“[a]lthough no one contextual factor is dispositive . . . several non-exclusive factors . . . 
are instructive” in conducting this analysis.179 Among those the court cited
175. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 
F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007); Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2006).
176. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 202.
177. Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Weintraub III, 593 
F.3d at 203).
178. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
424–25 (2006)).
179. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32–33 (citing Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 7–8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–21, 423; Williams, 480 F.3d at 694; Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter 
Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007)). “Applying these factors,” the court found that the 
plaintiff ’s “speech may have been related to the subject matter of her job, but it was not, strictly speaking, 
among her enumerated duties to make such speech,” and thus found for the employee-plaintiff on the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32–33.
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whether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the speech in 
question; the subject matter of the speech; whether the speech was made up 
the chain of command; whether the employee spoke at her place of 
employment; whether the speech gave objective observers the impression that 
the employee represented the employer when she spoke (lending it “official 
significance”); whether the employee’s speech derived from special knowledge 
obtained during the course of her employment; and whether there is a 
so-called citizen analogue to the speech.180
 While the Decotiis saga may not be over yet, in some courts there are workplace 
speech claims that are surviving a Garcetti analysis.181 Other courts, however, have 
held that an employee’s unsupported assertions that a particular function was not 
among her official duties were not dispositive. In Adams v. New York State Education 
Department, for example, a teacher’s complaints about school conditions and practices 
led to retaliation.182 In response to the teacher’s claims of a First Amendment 
violation, the district court found the teacher’s “conclusory statements that making 
the complaints in question did not fall within the scope of their job descriptions does 
not end the inquiry.”183 In ruling against the plaintiffs, the court relied on the “clear 
instructions” provided by Garcetti and Weintraub.184
 D. A Modest Proposal for a Return to Reason: Montle v. Westwood Heights
 In his dissent in Weintraub III, Judge Calabresi notes that “Garcetti leaves open the 
definition of ‘pursuant to official duties.’”185 Notwithstanding that Garcetti is inapposite 
in a First Amendment analysis where the speech in question took the form of a union 
grievance, that opening should be filled with an unambiguous definition and 
corresponding standard of “pursuant to official duties” that the courts may apply 
consistently and on which employers and employees may rely. The U.S. District Court 
180. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32
181. See, e.g., Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (discussing “ordinary duties” 
versus “official duties”); Day v. Borough of Carlisle, 1: CV-04-1040, 2006 WL 1892711 (M.D. Pa. July 
10, 2006) (plaintiff alleging no duty to report); Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C02-04975 MHP, 2006 
WL 1980401 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (showing evidence of culture of not reporting prevailed over 
employer’s assertion of duty to report).
182. 752 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
183. Id. at 427.
184. Id. It is worth noting that the court found “[t]his guidance” to be “relevant in the Court’s evaluation 
pursuant to the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility rule to test the sufficiency of a cause of action alleging 
unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Following a similar analysis, the Seventh Circuit 
in Trigillo v. Snyder found dispositive the fact that Trigillo’s speech was “written on department 
letterhead and signed by her as ‘Chief of Procurement.’” Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 
2008). Based upon these factors, the court found that Trigillo’s speech had been made pursuant to her 
official duties. Under this test as well, the filing of a union grievance cannot be deemed an official duty. 
See id. These cases would seem to suggest that the question of the scope of “official duties” is one of fact, 
not law, although the Supreme Court in Garcetti never reached that question.
185. Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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for the Eastern District of Michigan provided a step in the right direction in Montle 
v. Westwood Heights School District,186 issued just two weeks after Garcetti.
 In Montle, a probationary teacher claimed her termination was in retaliation for, 
among other things, her coming to work in a t-shirt containing a pro-union slogan.187 
The teacher claimed First Amendment protection, and the district court conducted 
what was essentially a Pickering analysis. First, the court considered whether Montle 
was speaking on a matter of public concern; second, it weighed Montle’s interest in 
commenting on a matter of public concern against the school district’s interest in 
promoting efficient operation of its business;188 and third, it determined whether 
Montle’s t-shirt message was a “substantial or motivating factor” in her termination.189 
By not engaging in an initial determination of the speaker’s status, and by not first 
looking for a citizen analogue, the court clearly did not follow Garcetti, a case it 
nevertheless cites favorably.190
 This (relatively) quiet act of (relatively benign) judicial defiance may be a harbinger 
of a potential return to reason in public workplace speech jurisprudence. A doctrinal 
test that disregards the status question of whether the employee was speaking as a 
private citizen or as a public employee—recognizing that this distinction is irrelevant 
to the interests of both the public and the public employer—but which instead begins 
by asking whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern sufficiently great as 
to render the employer’s interest in undisturbed operation of his business secondary is 
sound and rational. As Montle demonstrates, it is also workable. If the employee’s 
speech passes that initial threshold test of whether it addressed a matter of public 
concern, the court should engage in a balancing of competing interests between 
government and citizen. As part of this analysis, the court would ask whether the 
employee chose a reasonable form and forum for her speech. If she did, then the speech 
is protected under the First Amendment. If not, then the court might engage in a 
totality of the circumstances analysis, with burden of proof shifting between parties.
 As a matter of law, a union contract grievance filed by a public employee would 
always satisfy the second prong of this test.191 It constitutes a separate and unique 
category of speech that requires a different analysis because, as discussed in Part II 
above, it is mutually negotiated—thus, by definition, is acceptable to both employer 
and employee—and is protected by statute.192
186. 437 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
187. Id. at 653.
188. Relevant to this analysis was the degree of “disharmony” Montle’s speech case in the workplace. Id at 656.
189. Id. at 654–56.
190. In the end, the district court sustained the termination. Id. at 656.
191. On a related note, the National Labor Relations Board recently extended protection to work-related 
speech on online social network sites. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Says Rights Apply on Net, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 9, 2010, at B1.
192. See 2-6 Educ. Law § 613 (Matthew Bender, LEXIS 2010). Because of the constitutionally protected 
rights of association, employees may be dismissed for union membership, participation or activity only 
if the employing board can demonstrate a compelling state interest to be served. Greminger v. Seaborne, 
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 Such a test would appropriately emphasize the form of the speech over its content 
in the balancing of competing interests and would not require a citizen analogue. For 
instance, an internal union grievance filed with a supervisor is, in and of itself, 
unlikely to cause any disruption at all to the employer’s operation, whereas a 
newspaper editorial is much more likely to be highly disruptive.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pickering announced a two-part test for 
determining what workplace speech enjoys First Amendment protection and what 
speech does not. The Pickering balancing test was applied by the courts without 
significant modification for nearly forty years. In 2006, the Garcetti Court modified 
that analysis when it introduced a threshold “status” inquiry—whether the speaker was 
speaking as a citizen or an employee at the time of the speech—as a precondition to 
applying the Pickering balancing test. The calculus employed by the Court in engaging 
in that status inquiry involves a determination as to whether there exists a “citizen 
analogue” to the employee’s speech. The Court in Garcetti arrived at that calculus by 
focusing, for the first time, on the “citizen” element of Pickering’s “as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern” test. From Pickering until Garcetti, the courts had always 
focused on the “matter of public concern” element. The Garcetti Court noted that the 
“citizen” analysis focuses on the “official duties” the employee is required to perform. 
In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Weintraub III further 
modified the evolving workplace speech jurisprudence when it found that the filing of 
union contract grievance is an official duty of a public school teacher.
 This note argued that the Second Circuit’s holding is unsupported. The filing of a 
union grievance is a speech act that is protected by federal, state, and local labor laws. 
It is a right held by the public employee to be exercised—or not—only at that employee’s 
discretion and is a communication not for the employer, but to the employee on the 
employee’s own behalf. An employee cannot be compelled to file a grievance, even if 
doing so would be the only means of challenging a perceived wrong in the workplace. 
The filing of a grievance, therefore, cannot be seen as an employee’s official duty. 
Moreover, the Court’s focus on the form of the speech (union grievance and its citizen 
analogue) rather than on its subject (school safety in Weintraub and matters of public 
concern more broadly) irrationally places the interests of the public employer ahead of 
the interests of the members of the public it serves. Finally, permitting employer 
imposition of discipline or retaliation when a public employee engages in such speech, 
under the rationale that such speech is not protected by the First Amendment, 
effectively eviscerates those federal, state, and local labor laws.193
584 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1978). The state’s interest generally becomes compelling only when the employee’s 
activities are disruptive and impede either the employee’s own performance or the normal operations of 
the educational institution. McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1979); Yuen v. Bd. of Educ., 
77 Ill. App. 2d 353 (1966).
193. This is arguably so notwithstanding the fact that the employee-plaintiff, like David Weintraub, for 
example, may have brought the wrong legal claim in the wrong forum. That is, had Weintraub brought 
a claim of Taylor Law violation to the New York Public Employment Relations Board, he likely would 
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In the end, the current workplace speech jurisprudence unreasonably includes within 
Garcetti ’s broad reach the union contract grievance. This unnecessarily privileges the 
public employer’s right to efficient operation of services above the public employee’s 
right to speak out about workplace issues, as well as the public’s right to important, 
often otherwise unavailable, information concerning its safety and welfare. As more 
recent case law demonstrates, all three categories of rights may be protected without 
significant sacrifice. The first step toward that goal would be to allow First Amendment 
protection to workplace speech in the form of a union grievance that addresses a matter 
of public concern, regardless of the form in which that speech is made.
have emerged victorious, as the City of New York essentially conceded in its initial brief. Defendant’s 
Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 
593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 00-CV-4384), 2005 WL 3499475 at *8–9.
